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DISSECTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ADMISSIBILITY OF AUTOPSY REPORTS AFTER
CRAWFORD
Matthew Yanovitch'
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution guarantees a defendant in a criminal case "the right
... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."1 Hearsay evidence
that would otherwise be admissible in a civil trial must pass this
additional, constitutional barrier to admission in a criminal trial.2 Those
who stand accused of murder or manslaughter will likely face the
admission of powerful hearsay evidence: the autopsy report.
When prosecutors call a coroner or medical examiner who performs an
autopsy and writes a report as a witness at trial, Confrontation Clause
issues are avoided. But a difficult issue arises when the medical examiner
who performs an autopsy is deceased or otherwise unavailable.
Admitting the autopsy report without calling the medical examiner to
testify could violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront
his accusers.3 On the other hand, a blanket ban on the admission of
autopsy reports when the preparing medical examiner is unavailable
would make prosecuting "cold case" murders increasingly difficult,
creating a serious public policy issue.
' J.D., May 2007, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. The
author would like to thank Professor Clifford Fishman and Marc Emden, Esq. for their
mentorship. The author would also like to thank his wife, Amanda, and his children for
their patience and understanding during the writing process. Finally, the author would like
to thank fellow Law Review staffer Marko Cimbaljevich for contributing to the title of this
article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See FED. R. EVID. 801. The Advisory Committee Notes to Article VIII of the
Federal Rules of Evidence explain that, "[It]he pattern which emerges from the earlier
cases invoking the clause is substantially that of the hearsay rule, applied to criminal cases:
an accused is entitled to have the witnesses against him testify under oath, in the presence
of himself and trier, subject to cross examination ...." Id. art. VIII advisory committee's
notes.
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. See, e.g., People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863,869 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) ("Years may
pass between the performance of the autopsy and the apprehension of the perpetrator.
This passage of time can easily lead to the unavailability of the examiner who prepared the
autopsy report. . . . Unlike other forensic tests, an autopsy cannot be replicated by
another pathologist. Certainly it would be against society's interests to permit the
unavailability of the medical examiner who prepared the report to preclude the
prosecution of a homicide case.").
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Prior to the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Crawford v.
Washington,' prosecutors could submit autopsy reports without calling
the declarant medical examiner.6 Under the minimum constitutional
requirements set forth by the Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts,7 a
prosecutor needed only to satisfy a two-pronged Confrontation Clause
test by showing (1) that a good faith effort had been made to bring theS8
unavailable medical examiner to testify at trial; and (2) that the autopsy
report demonstrated sufficient "indicia of reliability" to be admissible
against the defendant.9
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court recently abandoned
the Roberts test.1° There, the Court rejected judicial determination of
reliability as the test for the admissibility of "testimonial" hearsay.1
Though the Court did not define "testimonial" hearsay, it held that ex
parte examinations of witnesses, such as the police interrogation in
question, were most certainly testimonial. 2 Indeed, such examinations
were the primary concern of the Framers in drafting the Confrontation
Clause." By contrast, the Court noted in dictum that certain forms of
14hearsay, such as business records, are not testimonial by their nature.
Courts have since grappled with the application of the Crawford doctrine
to autopsy reports, generally finding these reports to be "non-
5. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
6. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980); see also Paul Gianelli,
Admissibility of Lab Reports: The Right of Confrontation Post-Crawford, 19 CRIM. JUST.
26, 28 (2004) (citing cases decided prior to Crawford allowing the admissibility of autopsy
reports).
7. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66; see also United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 333 (2d Cir.
1993) (admitting an autopsy report under a Roberts analysis).
8. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-75. Exceptions to the requirement that the prosecution
make a good faith effort to produce the declarant were subsequently announced by the
Court in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399-400 (1986) (excepting out-of-court
statements by co-conspirators), and White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 348-49 (1992)
(excepting out-of-court spontaneous declarations and statements made for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment).
9. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66; see also PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING
EVIDENCE 548 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining the two-pronged Roberts test).
10. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-69.
11. Id. at 61 ("Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection ... to amorphous notions of
'reliability."').
12. Id. at 50-53.
13. Id. at 50 ("[Tlhe principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed
was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused.").
14. Id. at 56.
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testimonial" business or public records, thereby avoiding the public
policy problem in cold cases. 5
This Comment examines the admissibility of autopsy reports in light of
Sixth Amendment principles. This Comment first discusses the law
governing the admissibility of autopsy reports under the now-abrogated
Roberts test. This Comment next discusses Crawford v. Washington,
which fundamentally changed Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Then,
this Comment digests several state court opinions that have attempted to
apply Crawford to autopsy reports. This Comment subsequently
analyzes the trend of state courts to classify reports as "non-testimonial"
business or public records, and the state courts' policies and rationales
for categorizing autopsy reports as non-testimonial. Finally, this
Comment explains why the state courts' opinions may be in tension with
the language of Crawford and suggests ways the Supreme Court could
further refine Crawford if it agrees with the state courts' rationale.
I. THE ROAD TO CONFRONTATION
A. Admissibility of Autopsy Reports under Roberts
Prior to Crawford, courts applied Ohio v. Roberts when evaluating a
Confrontation Clause objection to the admission of an autopsy report
absent the medical examiner who prepared it.16 Before Roberts, no
consistent framework existed within which to analyze cases where the
declarant did not testify." The Roberts Court linked scattered prior
precedent to establish a definitive two-pronged test to determine the
constitutionality of admitting challenged hearsay evidence." The
prosecutor had to first satisfy the "declarant prong"'9 by either calling the
15. E.g., Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 831-35 (Md. 2006); People v. Durio, 794
N.Y.S.2d 863,867-69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
16. See supra note 8. In Roberts, Herschel Roberts was arrested for forging a check.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. At a preliminary hearing, Roberts' lawyer called the victim's
daughter as a defense witness in an attempt to solicit an admission that she gave Roberts
permission to use the checks. Id. The witness denied having given the checks to Roberts,
but despite five subpoenas for her appearance at trial, she did not appear. Id. at 58-59.
The State moved to admit the transcripts of the testimony "relying on [an Ohio statute]
which permits the use of preliminary examination testimony of a witness who 'cannot for
any reason be produced at the trial."' Id. at 59 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2945.49(A)(2) (Lexis Nexis 2006)). Although Roberts objected to the admission of the
transcript on the grounds that it violated his Confrontation Clause rights, the trial court
admitted it into evidence. Id. at 59-60.
17. GIANNELLI, supra note 9, at 528.
18. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66; see also GIANNELLI, supra note 9, at 528
(describing the test as "two-pronged").
19. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO HEARSAY 92 (3d ed. 2007)
(using the term "declarant prong" to label the first Roberts requirement).
2008]
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declarant as a witness or by demonstrating that the prosecutor had madeS 20
a good-faith effort to secure the declarant's presence at the trial.
Second, the prosecutor had to satisfy the "reliability" prong by showing
either that the statement fell within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception,
or that it had "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.'
The Supreme Court modified the declarant prong of the Roberts test in
United States v. Inadi.22 There the Court held that a co-conspirator's
statements could be admitted under the Confrontation Clause regardless
of the availability of the declarant.2' The Court concluded that these
statements have "independent evidentiary significance 24 because of the
context in which they were made, and the declarant's in-court testimony
would not be as important to the truth-finding process as the hearsay
21
statement admitted in context. Subsequently, in White v. Illinois, the
Court included statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis as
well as excited utterances to the category of hearsay exceptions not
requiring the unavailability of the declarant under the Sixth
Amendment.2 ' Thus, if a hearsay statement had independent evidentiary
significance, the declarant prong would have been automatically satisfied
without proof of a good-faith effort to produce the declarant.
21
Manocchio v. Moran provides an example of an in-depth Roberts
analysis of the admissibility of an autopsy report.2 Nicholas Manocchio
20. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-75. The Roberts court explained:
The law does not require the doing of a futile act. Thus, if no possibility of
procuring the witness exists (as, for example, the witness' intervening death),
"good faith" demands nothing of the prosecution. But if there is the possibility,
albeit remote, that affirmative measures might produce the declarant, the
obligation of good faith may demand their effectuation. "The lengths to which
the prosecution must go... is a question of reasonableness."
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 148, 189 n.22 (1970))
(alteration in original).
21. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; see also FISHMAN, supra note 19, at 92 (using the term
"'reliability' prong" to label the second Roberts requirement).
22. 475 U.S. 387, 391-96 (1986).
23. Id. at 399-400; see also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
24. FISHMAN, supra note 19, at 92. Professor Fishman uses the term "independent
evidentiary significance" to describe those hearsay exceptions under which "the
prosecutor need not call the declarant." Id. The Inadi court described a statement
admitted under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule (under which the
declarant must be produced) as "seldom ha[ving] independent evidentiary significance of
its own." Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).
25. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394-95.
26. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 348-49 (1992).
27. Id. at 356-57. The White court uses the term "substantial probative value" instead
of "independent evidentiary significance." Id.
28. Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 773-76 (1st Cir. 1990).
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was charged with the November 1980 murder of Richard Fournier.2
According to an eyewitness, Fournier was severely beaten in a parking
lot in North Providence, Rhode Island. ° Fournier died at the hospital
less than an hour after the beating.31  Dr. Joel Zirkin, a forensic
pathologist and Rhode Island's Associate Chief Medical Examiner,
prepared an autopsy report pursuant to his statutory duties. 2 Dr.
Zirkin's report described the victim's injuries, as well as facts reported to
Dr. Zirkin by the police, and concluded that the cause of death was
homicide.33
Prior to trial, Dr. Zirkin left the Medical Examiner's office and moved
to Israel.3 Dr. Zirkin was not brought back to testify, nor deposed prior
to trial.35 At the trial, the prosecutor introduced the autopsy report by
31
calling a different Medical Examiner to testify. Manocchio objected to
the admission of the autopsy report, asserting that it violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confront Dr. Zirkin 7 The trial judge overruled the31
objection, and Manocchio was convicted of manslaughter. He appealed
the conviction to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, which found no
constitutional violation in the admission of the autopsy report 9
Manocchio then sought habeas corpus relief from the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island, which found a Sixth
Amendment violation and "directed issuance of the writ ... unless the
State of Rhode Island afforded [him] a new trial . . . ."40 The State
appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit.41
29. Id. at 771-72.
30. Id. at 782.
31. Id. at 772.
32. Id. at 772, 776; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-3 (Lexis Nexis 2001) ("The office
of state medical examiners shall be responsible for: (1) The investigation of deaths within
the state that in its judgment might reasonably be expected to involve causes of death
enumerated in this chapter [including homicide].").
33. Manocchio, 919 F.2d at 772.
34. Id. at 772.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 772-73. Dr. Burns, the Medical Examiner called to testify, was one of three
signatories to the autopsy report performed by Dr. Zirking. Id. at 772.
37. Id. at 773.
38. Id. at 771-72.
39. State v. Manocchio, 497 A.2d 1, 8 (R.I. 1985) ("We conclude that the right of
confrontation of defendant[] was not violated. This conclusion is based on the trial
justice's finding that the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the autopsy report
were trustworthy. We conclude that admission of the autopsy report was not error.").
40. Manocchio, 919 F.2d at 771.
41. Id.
20081
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42The First Circuit began its Roberts analysis with the declarant prong.
The court determined that it was unnecessary to consider whether the
state had made a good faith effort to produce Dr. Zirkin.4  Rather, it
held that Inadi controlled, and that the autopsy report satisfied the
declarant prong regardless of Dr. Zirkin's availability. Like co-
conspirator statements, the court reasoned, autopsy reports have
independent evidentiary significance because of the context in which
they are prepared.45
Finding the declarant prong to be satisfied, the court moved on to the
reliability prong.46 After noting the two ways in which the reliability
prong may be satisfied, the court concluded that autopsy reports do not
fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.4 ' Despite recognizing that
other courts (including courts in Rhode Island) have held that autopsy
reports qualify under the business records and public records exceptions
to the hearsay rule,48 the court expressed doubt that autopsy reports fall
squarely within these "firmly rooted" exceptions due to the subjective
nature of certain conclusions in autopsy reports.49 Because it found that
autopsy reports did not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the
court required the prosecution to demonstrate that autopsy reports show
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" in order to satisfy the
Confrontation Clause. 0
Receptive to the defendant's arguments that autopsy reports contain
several different types of hearsay statements, the court divided the
statements into four categories and evaluated each for "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness. '"" First, "descriptive observations of the
condition of the corpse" were held to possess particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness for all the reasons that attach to business records: "the
routine and repetitive circumstances under which such reports are made
[and the existence of] statutorily regularized procedures and established
42. Id. at 773-74.
43. See id. at 774.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 774-75.
46. See id. at 776.
47. See id.
48. See FED. R. EvID. 803(6) (excepting business records from the hearsay rule); id.
803(8) (excepting certain public records from the hearsay rule).
49. Manocchio, 919 F.2d at 776-77 ("[T]hese cases fall short of establishing that
autopsy reports, as such, are a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Because such reports may
contain the examiner's views as to such matters as whether death was caused by homicide
and may incorporate information from outside the medical examiner's office, problems
are raised going beyond a simple application of the mentioned exceptions.").
50. Id. at 777.
51. Id. at 778.
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medical standards" to which autopsies must adhere, and the specialized
52training that those who prepare the reports must have. Second, the
court found that "medical opinions as to the nature of any injuries" and
the medical cause of the victim's death also demonstrate particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness because they follow on the doctor's
physical findings and reflect his expert judgment on a subject he is
professionally and legally charged with determining and recording. 3
On the other hand, the court found that "statements [in an autopsy
report] as to circumstances surrounding the death taken from police
reports or other sources" do not demonstrate particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness.54 Nonetheless, the court decided that inclusion of such
statements here was not prejudicial to the defendant because other
witnesses had independently established the information relayed in the
report. 5 The court also held that the fourth category of statements, the
doctor's conclusions as to whether the death was a homicide, do not
demonstrate particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." However, on
the facts of the case, the court found the admission of these statements
"at worst, harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt," because the
doctor's finding of homicide "simply reflected the examiner's opinion
that injuries received in an unquestioned beating-rather than some
other medical cause-had caused death."57 As a result, the court found
that the admission of the autopsy report did not violate the
Confrontation Clause under the Roberts test.58
B. Crawford Changes Everything
Crawford v. Washington fundamentally changed Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence by announcing a new test of constitutionality under the
Confrontation Clause.59 Michael Crawford was charged with assault and
attempted murder after he stabbed a man whom he believed had
attempted to rape his wife. 6° The principal issue at trial was whether
61Crawford acted in self-defense. Crawford testified at trial that he
52. Id. at 778-79.
53. Id. at 778, 779.
54. See id. at 779, 782-83.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 783.
57. Id. at 783-84.
58. Id. at 784-85.
59. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
60. Id. at 38, 40.
61. Id. at 40.
2008]
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believed he saw the victim attempting to draw some type of weapon
before Crawford stabbed him.62
The defendant's testimony contradicted his wife Sylvia's statement to
the police following the incident. 6' The Washington State marital
privilege, which prevents "a spouse from testifying without the other
spouse's consent," precluded Crawford's wife from testifying at trial.
64
The state introduced a tape recording of Sylvia's statements into
evidence pursuant to the "statements against penal interest" exception to
the hearsay rule.6' The prosecutor was allowed to play the tape during
the trial, and Crawford was convicted of assault.66 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Washington applied a Roberts analysis and found no
constitutional violation. 67  The court determined that the "declarant
prong" was satisfied because Sylvia was unavailable due to the marital
privilege. 68 It also found the "reliability prong" to be satisfied because,
although statements against interest do not fall within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, Sylvia's statements demonstrated particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.6 9
After an in-depth examination of the historical context in which the
Sixth Amendment was drafted,7° Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
determined that "ItIhis history supports two inferences about the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment."71 The Court wrote that first, "the
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused. 7'  And second, "the
Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a
witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify,
and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination."73
62. Id. at 38-39.
63. Id. at 38-40.
64. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994)).
65. Id. The State successfully argued that Sylvia's admission that she led Crawford to
the victim's apartment constituted a statement against penal interest, because by
facilitating the assault, Sylvia was culpable for the crime. See id.
66. Id. at 40-41.
67. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 662-64 (Wash. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
68. Id. at 662.
69. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40-41 ("Sylvia was not shifting blame but rather
corroborating her husband's story that he acted in self-defense . . .; she had direct
knowledge as an eyewitness; she was describing recent events; and she was being
questioned by a 'neutral' law enforcement officer.").
70. See id. at 42-50.
71. Id. at 50.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 53-54.
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The Court cited an English language dictionary published in 1828 for a
revolutionary-era definition of testimony: "'[a] solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.'
74
Though it declined to provide a comprehensive definition of
"testimonial" for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment, 75 the Court
74. Id. at 51 (quoting 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828)). For an argument that Justice Scalia has misread the historical
record, see generally Thomas Y. Davies, What Did The Framers Know and When Did
They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105
(2005), stating that "[t]he historical claims regarding the original meaning of the
Confrontation Clause in [Crawford] provide the latest installment of fictional originalism."
75. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial."'). The Court has handed down only one
decision since Crawford that further fleshes out the meaning of "testimonial." The
consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana involved the
admissibility of statements made to government officials in the context of domestic
violence situations. Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2270, 2272 (2006).
In Davis, Adrian Davis's former girlfriend, Michelle McCottry, called 911 during a
domestic disturbance. Id. at 2270-71. She told the 911 operator that Davis was beating her
again, and whenever McCottry began to talk, the operator cut her off with questions
regarding Davis' appearance, age, and other descriptive information. Id. at 2271. Two
police officers arrived several minutes later and found a shaken McCottry, but Davis had
left the scene. Id. Davis was subsequently arrested and charged with "felony violation of
a domestic no-contact order." Id.
McCottry did not testify at Davis's trial. Id. The two responding police officers were
the prosecution's only witnesses, but neither could testify that Davis had injured
McCottry. Id. The trial court allowed the prosecutor to play the 911 tape as evidence to
establish Davis as the assailant, and Davis was convicted. Id.
The Court, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority (as he did in Crawford), held that
McCottry's statements to the 911 operator were not testimonial. Id. at 2277. The Court's
test focused on the purpose of the interrogation: "Statements are non-testimonial when
made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency." Id. at 2273. By contrast, "[statements] are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that ... the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Id. at
2273-74. The Court distinguished McCottry's 911 call from the interrogation of Sylvia
Crawford in Crawford: "McCottry was speaking about events as they were actually
happening," whereas Sylvia's interrogation "took place hours after the events she
described had occurred." Id. at 2276. Moreover, "McCottry (unlike Sylvia Crawford) was
facing an ongoing emergency. Although one might call 911 to provide a narrative report
of a crime absent any imminent danger, McCottry's call was plainly a call for help against
bona fide physical threat." Id.
According to the Court, determining the testimonial nature of statements made in
response to police interrogation in the Hammon case was a "much easier task." Id. at
2278. There, the police responded to a report of a domestic disturbance at the home of
Hershel and Amy Hammon, finding Amy alone on the porch. Id. at 2272. Amy allowed
the police into the home, where the officers noticed broken glass on the floor near a
furnace. Id. Hershel was in the kitchen at the time. Id.
2008]
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provided three possible definitions, or "formulations," of "testimonial
statements. 7 6 They include "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent; 77 "extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions;"78 and "statements that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial., 79 In dictum, the
Court also stated that certain hearsay exceptions-"business records
[and] statements in furtherance of a conspiracy" -are not testimonial by
their nature.80 However, the Court held that under even the narrowest of
definitions, Sylvia Crawford's statements in response to structured police
interrogation were certainly testimonial.81
82The majority also condemned the Roberts test. First, it found that
Roberts unnecessarily afforded constitutional scrutiny to statements that
were "far removed from the core concerns of the clause" (such as non-
testimonial statements). 83 Second, on the facts of Crawford, use of the
Roberts test would have resulted in admission of ex parte testimony
One officer remained in the kitchen with Hershel while the other went into the living
room with Amy to ask her what happened. Id. Amy told the officer about Hershel's
violent behavior, and the officer had her fill out a battery affidavit. Id.
The Court found the statements within the affidavit to be "not much different from the
statements we found to be testimonial in Crawford." Id. at 2278. Notably, at the time the
statements were given, there was no longer an ongoing argument between Amy and
Hershel, Amy had told the officers that everything was fine, and the officer was seeking to
determine what had already happened rather than what was going on at that moment. Id.
The Court found that, "[o]bjectively viewed, the ... sole[] purpose of the interrogation
was to investigate a possible [past] crime." Id. As such, Amy's responses were considered
testimonial. Id.
76. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
77. Id. at 51-52 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-
9410)) (explaining that such testimony includes, "affidavits, custodial examinations, prior
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially").
78. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment), quoted in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
79. Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsflnewsissues/amicus-attachments/$FILE/crawford.pdf,
quoted in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
80. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
81. See id. at 52 ("Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations
are also testimonial under even a narrow standard."); id. at 61 ("Sylvia Crawford's
statement is testimonial under any definition.").
82. Id. at 60-69.
83. Id. at 60-61.
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based only upon a judicial finding of reliability.8 The Court highlighted
the unpredictable and subjective nature of the Roberts reliability test by
reviewing numerous judicial decisions demonstrating contradictory
outcomes under similar factual scenarios.8 Concluding that a judicial
determination of reliability was not the proper constitutional test, the
Court stated: "[T]he Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of
evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed
in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination."
86
II. COURTS STRUGGLE WITH CRAWFORD
This Comment will now examine how five state courts have applied, or
attempted to avoid applying, Crawford to the decision to admit autopsy
reports into evidence where the doctor who performed the autopsy did
not testify at trial. The courts in each case came to the same ultimate
result, upholding the defendants' convictions despite Confrontation
Clause objections. However, the quality and depth of the reasoning in
these decisions varies considerably.
The Court of Appeals of Texas analyzed the post-Crawford admission
of an autopsy report in the 2005 case of Moreno Denoso v. State.8"
Rogelio Moreno Denoso was convicted of murder in the shooting death
of David Quintero."9 According to the defendant, he was asked by four
friends to pick up the victim, an acquaintance, and drive to a remote part
of Hidalgo County, Texas. There, Denoso alleged the other four men
shot and killed the victim and ordered Denoso to help dispose of the
body.91  The victim's burnt and decomposed body was found by
authorities, and an autopsy was performed in which gunshot wounds
were determined to be the cause of death. The medical examiner who
prepared the autopsy report died before he could testify at trial.93
84. Id. at 62, 65-66 (condemning the Roberts test for "allow[ing] a jury to hear
evidence, untested by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of
reliability").
85. Id. at 63.
86. Id. at 61.
87. Smith v. State, 898 So.2d 907, 909 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); State v. Lackey, 120
P.3d 332, 342 (Kan. 2005); Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 853 (Md. 2006); People v. Durio,
794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864, 869 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 2005); Moreno Denoso v. State, 156 S.W.3d 166,
172 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).
88. 156 S.W.3d at 180-83.
89. Id. at 171-72.
90. Id. at 172.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 172, 182.
93. Id. at 181.
2008]
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Denoso appealed his conviction on multiple counts, including that the
admission of the autopsy report violated his Confrontation Clause
rights.94
After holding that autopsy reports fell within the Texas hearsay
exception for public records, 95 the court addressed the Confrontation
Clause issue.96 The court summarized Crawford, and reviewed how
Texas courts had applied Crawford to a variety of situations.9 The court
then applied Crawford to the autopsy report. 98 It stated that an autopsy
report "is not prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury, or at a former trial. It is not a statement given in response to police
interrogations." 99 Accordingly, the court concluded that "the autopsy
report in this case does not fall within the categories of testimonial
evidence described in Crawford [because it] was non-testimonial in
nature..'.. In dictum, the court noted that even if it was error to admit
the autopsy report, it would have been harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt in light of the sufficiency of the other evidence against
the defendant.' 1
A New York trial judge addressed this same issue in People v. Durio.'0 2
Durio was convicted of murder for shooting a man twice in the back.0 3
The judge admitted the autopsy report as a business record, accompanied
by in-court testimony from a medical examiner who neither participated
in the victim's autopsy or the writing of the report.'4 The testifying
medical examiner used the report as a reference and rendered her own
opinion about the cause of death.05  Durio moved to vacate his
conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds, arguing that the autopsy
report was testimonial in nature, and therefore inadmissible.'
6
The court began its analysis of the admissibility of the autopsy report,
pursuant to Crawford, by finding that "business records are specifically
exempted from challenge because they are outside the 'core testimonial
94. Id. at 172, 181.
95. Id. at 180-81. Denoso unsuccessfully argued that the law enforcement
exclusionary clause of the public records exception should apply to medical examiners. Id.
96. Id. at 181.
97. Id. at 181-82.
98. Id. at 182.
99. Id. (citation omitted)
100. Id. The court further noted that "the new rule articulated in Crawford is not
applicable in this case." Id.
101. Id. at 182-83.
102. 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867-69 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 2005).
103. Id. at 864.
104. Id. at 864-65.
105. Id. at 865.
106. Id. at 864.
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statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude."'"O'
The court noted that the reason for Crawford's classification of business
records as non-testimonial is that they are prepared in the regular course
of business, and therefore, by their nature, are not prepared for the
purposes of litigation." The court also held that under New York law
the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner is a "business," and therefore
autopsy reports are "business record[s]."' '°
Further, the court distinguished autopsy reports from blood tests,1
which had been categorized as testimonial by an intermediate appellate
court one year earlier in People v. Rogers."1 The inadmissible blood test
reports in Rogers were "initiated by the prosecution and generated by
the desire to discover evidence against [the] defendant""' whereas "[t]he
autopsy report in [Durio] was not manufactured for the benefit of the
prosecution.""' 3 Furthermore, the court pointed out that autopsies are
performed and reports are generated under statutory mandate, not at the
request of prosecutors. 4  The mere possibility of future use of an
autopsy report at trial, according to the court, "does not mean that it was
composed for that accusatory purpose or that its use by a prosecutor is
the inevitable consequence of its composition. 1 5
107. Id. at 867 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 868 ("A public agency such as the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
(OCME) constitutes a 'business' for the purposes of [the New York statute]."); see also
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4518(a) (McKinney 2007) ("The term business includes a business,
profession, occupation and calling of every kind."); cf People v. Foster, 261 N.E.2d 389,
391 (N.Y. 1970) (concluding that certain functions of the police department are business
functions), quoted in Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
110. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
111. 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396-97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). There, the defendant was
convicted of first degree rape and sodomy. Id. at 394. Laboratory analysis of the victim's
blood was admitted by the trial judge without the testimony of the scientist who
performed the test. Id. at 396-97. The victim's blood alcohol level "was especially
significant here, as the victim's intoxication level [was] directly related to her capability to
consent [to sex]." Id. at 397. The court concluded that the blood test was testimonial
because it was conducted at the direction of the prosecution in anticipation of trial Id.
112. Id. at 397.
113. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d at 868-69.
114. Id. at 868; see also N.Y. CITY, CHARTER ch. 22, § 557(g) (2004) ("The chief
medical examiner shall keep full and complete records in such form as may be provided by
law. The chief medical examiner shall promptly deliver to the appropriate district attorney
copies of all records relating to every death as to which there is, in the judgment of the
medical examiner in charge, any indication of criminality. Such records shall not be open
to public inspection.").
115. Id. at 869; see also People v. Foster, 261 N.E.2d 389, 391-92 (N.Y. 1970) ("While it
is true that such records may later be used in litigation, such was not the sole purpose
when they were made, and, therefore, they should not be excluded merely because this
was a possible future use."), quoted in Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
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Finally, the court addressed the public policy interest in favor of
holding autopsy reports non-testimonial, stating that "courts cannot
ignore the practical implications that would follow from treating autopsy
reports as inadmissible." '116 The decision also noted the cold case
dilemma: years may pass between the preparation of the autopsy report
and the prosecution of the crime, and that this time lapse can lead to the
unavailability of the medical examiner."' "[C]ertainly it would be against
society's interests to permit the unavailability of the medical examiner
who prepared the report to preclude the prosecution of a homicide
case." s18  The court concluded that the autopsy report was non-
testimonial and that its admission did not violate the Confrontation
Clause.1 1 9
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals similarly confronted this
issue in Smith v. State."20 Frankie David Smith was charged with murder
after he killed a former business partner in a dispute over a debt.21
Smith met the victim, Stumler, at a warehouse where they had previously
operated a business together. 122 Smith claimed that after he told the
victim he could not pay the debt, the victim sprayed him with a substance
that burned his eyes.12 Stumler then hit Smith twice with a bat. 124 Smith
wrestled the bat away from Stumler and struck him in the head three
times.' 25 Smith then wrapped the victim's head in a plastic garbage bag;
he later claimed he did so to keep blood from getting on the floor.
26
Finally, he bound the victim with duct tape, wrapped the body in plastic
121wrap, and drove to Florida where he disposed of the remains.
At trial, Smith claimed self-defense, and contended that the victim
died from the blows to the head with the bat, and not as a result of
suffocation from the bag placed over his head.' The autopsy report,
however, which was admitted over a Confrontation Clause objection,




120. 898 So.2d 907, 909 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).




125. Id. at 908-09.
126. Id. at 909.
127. Id.
128. Id. ("The State's theory of the case was that Stumler was not killed by the blows
to his head but was asphyxiated when Smith secured the plastic bag over his head. Smith
admitted that he killed Stumler, but he claimed that he did so in self-defense.").
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listed the cause of death as asphyxiation. 29 Dr. Marie Herrmann, the
medical examiner who performed the autopsy, did not testify at trial
despite being available.' 30 Instead, a different medical examiner testified,
and, based on Dr. Herrmann's report, reached the same conclusion about
the cause of death. 3' A jury convicted Smith of manslaughter and
sentenced him to twenty years in prison.1
32
Judge Cobb, writing for the majority, summarily concluded that
Crawford "does not appear to be implicated here because the evidence at
issue is not testimonial.' ' 3  Therefore, "[tihe admissibility of the autopsy
report and materials associated with it is governed by hearsay law [and]
[t]his Court has held that an autopsy report is admissible as a business-
records exception to the hearsay rule."' 3 Notwithstanding the court's
finding that the autopsy report was non-testimonial and that it fell within
the business records hearsay exception, the court nevertheless found a
Confrontation Clause violation.
The court referred to the Supreme Court decision in California v.
Green for the proposition that "the protections afforded by the
Confrontation Clause have sometimes resulted in 'admissible' hearsay
evidence being ruled inadmissible.' ' 136 The court concluded that "[u]nder
the facts of this case, the Confrontation Clause preclude[s] the
prosecution from proving an essential element of its case by hearsay
evidence alone.' ' 137 This error was deemed harmless, however, in light of
Smith's testimony and the jury's verdict of manslaughter.
129. Id. at 915.
130. Id. Dr. Herrmann had left her job with the County and had entered private
practice. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 908.
133. Id. at 916.
134. Id. (citing Adams v. State, 955 So.2d 1037, 1073 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003), rev'd on
other grounds 955 So.2d 1106 (Ala. 2005)).
135. Id. at 916-17.
136. Id. at 916 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970)).
137. Id. at 917.
138. Id. at 918 ("The jury in this case rejected the prosecution's assertion that Smith
committed murder; it instead found him guilty of manslaughter .... [W]e find that the
evidence presented was sufficient to support the jury's finding that Smith was guilty of
manslaughter .... The facts overwhelmingly support the manslaughter conviction, even
without consideration of the autopsy report.").
In concurrence, Judge Shaw agreed that admission of the autopsy report was harmless
error, if it was error, but questioned the majority's confrontation clause analysis. Id. at
920-23 (Shaw, J., concurring). Judge Shaw noted that although Crawford suggested that
business records are not testimonial, the Court "did not specifically address statements
made by a medical examiner in an autopsy report prepared in anticipation of a criminal
prosecution." Id. at 921. Additionally, Judge Shaw stated that Crawford had not
expressly overturned Illinois v. White, and therefore cautioned that any finding of a
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State v. Lackey provided the Kansas Supreme Court with its first
opportunity to decide on the admissibility of autopsy reports under
Crawford.13 9 In December of 1982, the body of the victim was found
stuffed in a closet in her Salina, Kansas mobile home.4 0 Dr. David Clark,
the county coroner, visited the scene and ordered an autopsy, which Dr.
William Eckert performed.14 The case laid dormant until 1996,142 and Dr.
Eckert had died by the time it went to trial.43
A major issue at trial was the time of death of the victim, which the
autopsy report did not indicate. ' 4 Nonetheless, Dr. Eckert's autopsy
report was admitted in its entirety, including his opinion as to the cause
of death. 45 At trial, Dr. Clark testified, based upon his observations at
statement as non-testimonial ought nevertheless also satisfy the White requirement of
independent evidentiary significance. Id. at 923 ("[White holds] that a statement that
qualifies for admission under a 'firmly rooted' hearsay exception is so trustworthy that
adversarial testing can be expected to add little to its reliability."); see also supra notes 29-
30 and accompanying text.
139. State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332, 348 (Kan. 2005).
140. Id. at 341. The facts of the case are grisly. Robert Henry Lackey, a drifter using
the alias "Bob Moore," found a place to stay and worked as a cook at the Salina Gospel
Mission. Id. at 340. His victim, "S.B.," was a 22-year-old college student volunteering at
the mission. Id. The two became friends, but Lackey wanted more, and became angry
when S.B. rejected his advances. Id.
On December 11, 1982, Lackey spent the afternoon drinking by himself at a local bar;
at around 6 p.m., he took a cab from the bar to a convenience store within walking
distance of S.B.'s mobile home. Id. at 340-41. Four to five hours later, he took a cab from
the same convenience store back the mission. Id. at 341. At 7:30 a.m. the next morning,
clergy at the mission discovered that Lackey was gone, along with all of his belongings and
S.B. was never heard from again. See id.
S.B.'s boyfriend returned to Salina from out of town, and was unable to locate her. See
id. at 341. He even stayed a few nights in her trailer during the week of December 12
through 17, 1982. Id. He concluded that she left town. He discovered S.B.'s body when
he was moving his belongings out of the trailer. Id. She had bruises on her neck and "was
wearing socks and underwear and her jeans were pulled down around her ankles." Id.
141. Id. at 341.
142. See id. at 342. The physical evidence from the initial investigation in 1982 was
preserved; however, that investigation did not lead to an arrest. See id. In 1996, the
Kansas Bureau of Investigation and the Salina Police received a tip from Canadian
authorities that a "Robert Moore" had taken part in a homicide in Salina in 1982. Id.
Through the Canadian tip, investigators learned that their suspect's name was Robert
Lackey. Id. Witnesses from the 1982 investigation were re-interviewed and shown a 1979
picture of Lackey, whom they identified as Bob Moore. Id. DNA testing was performed
on fluid residue from underwear found under Lackey's bed at the mission; these fluids
matched those found in the victim's rape kit. Id. Lackey was tracked to Alabama where
he was arrested. Id. In March 2002, he was extradited to Kansas to stand trial. Id.
143. Id. at 341.
144. Id. at 352. Although not specified in the opinion, the time of death appears
critical to a possible alibi defense for Lackey, or to raise the possibility that S.B.'s
boyfriend committed the crime. See id.
145. Id. at 346. 352.
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the crime scene, that the cause of death was strangulation and that the
body had been in the closet for six to eight days.1' 6 A second pathologist,
Dr. Mitchell, testified for the state that based on his reading of the
record, the victim had been strangled at least one or two days prior to the
discovery of the body.1 47 But Dr. Mitchell could not provide a maximum
time that the victim had been dead before the body was discovered.
On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of the autopsy
report on Confrontation Clause grounds.149 After finding that the reports
fell within the Kansas business records and public records exceptions to
the hearsay rule,"O the court addressed the Confrontation Clause issue."'
The defendant argued that in order to determine whether the report was
testimonial, a court should look to "the reasonable expectation of how
the report[] will be used."'52 Because autopsies of homicide victims are
performed with criminal litigation in mind, the defendant argued that
they must therefore be testimonial."' The court responded to this
argument by noting that "none of the cases which have addressed
autopsy reports under Crawford have adopted this point of view."'' 5A It
then summarized the case law from other jurisdictions and found
146. Id. at 341.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 342.
150. Id. at 346-48. The court noted that, at the time of S.B.'s death, there was
a statutory requirement that coroners file autopsy reports with the district court. Id. at
347-48. The court therefore concluded that "[slince a copy of the autopsy report was
required to be filed with the clerk of the district court.., it follows that the autopsy report
would.., qualify as a copy of an official record." Id. at 348.
151. Id. at 348.
152. Id. at 349.
153. Id. While the coroner may have been required to perform an autopsy pursuant to
Kansas statute, the defendant argued, all those situations where an autopsy is required are
for the purposes of litigation. Id. For example, the statute provides:
When any person dies, or human body is found dead in the state, and the death is
suspected to have been the result of violence, caused by unlawful means or by
suicide, or by casualty, or suddenly when the decedent was in apparent health, or
when decedent was not regularly attended by a licensed physician, or in any
suspicious or unusual manner, or when in police custody, or when in a jail or
correctional institution .... or when the determination of the cause of a death is
held to be in the public interest, the coroner ... shall be notified ....
KAN. STAT. ANN. §22a-231 (1995 & Supp. 2003), quoted in Lackey, 120 P.3d at 349.
Therefore, to argue that the report was conducted in the regular course of business would
not "analyze autopsy or coroner's reports by examining the reasonable expectation of how
the reports will be used." Lackey, 120 P.3d at 349.
154. Lackey, 120 P.3d at 349.
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persuasive the approach taken by Maryland's intermediate appellate
court.
55
For the purposes of categorizing statements within the report as
testimonial or not, the court adopted the Maryland court's distinction
between "factual, routine, descriptive, and nonanalytical findings" on the
one hand, and "contested opinions, speculations, and conclusions" on the
other.16 Because "routine and descriptive observations of the physical
body [occur] in an environment where the medical examiner would have
little incentive to fabricate the results," the court held that such
statements were non-testimonial.5 5 But opinions and conclusions drawn
from the objective findings were considered testimonial, and as such, the
right to confrontation applies.5  Thus, the court concluded that
testimonial statements should be redacted from autopsy reports prior to
admission if the declarant will not testify.59 Applying this reasoning to
the facts of Lackey, the court held that although admitting the autopsy
report without redacting Dr. Eckert's testimonial conclusions as to the
cause of death was error, it was nevertheless harmless'6°
When Maryland's highest court reviewed the intermediate appellate
decision in Rollins v. State-the decision the Lackey court found most
persuasive-it cited the Lackey court's analysis with approval, although
it applied a slightly different analysis. Wesley Allen Rollins was
charged with first-degree murder and other crimes in the death of
seventy-one year old Irene Ebberts. 112 Family members found Ebberts
dead on her bed amid evidence of a burglary. 63 In addition to the
detailed descriptions of the body's physical and chemical condition, the
autopsy report performed by medical examiner Dr. Pestaner included
opinions that "the manner of death was 'homicide"' and "that the cause
of death was 'smothering.'' 64 At trial, the judge admitted the report
after redacting these conclusions. 6 Although Dr. Pestaner did not
155. Id. at 350-52 (citing Rollins v. State, 866 A.2d 926, 951-52 (Md. App. 2005), affd
897 A.2d 821 (Md. 2006)).
156. Id. at 351.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 351-52.
160. See id. at 352. The time of death, not the cause of death, was at issue, and Dr.
Eckert did not speculate on the time of death in the report. Id. The cause of death was
not contested by the defendant, and the evidence of the cause of death was cumulative in
light of the testimony of Dr. Mitchell and Dr. Clark. Id.
161. See Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 833-34 (Md. 2006); infra Part III.C.
162. Rollins, 897 A.2d at 823-24.
163. Id. at 824-25.
164. Id. at 825.
165. Id. at 826-27.
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testify, Dr. Mary Ripple, another medical examiner, testified as an expert
at trial and reached the same conclusions. 66 Rollins argued that Dr.
Ripple's testimony was based on hearsay statements provided by police
167detectives and unrelated to Dr. Pestaner's medical findings.
In response to Rollins' claim that the admission of Dr. Ripple's
testimony and the autopsy report violated his Confrontation Clause
rights, the court first discussed Crawford and catalogued the post-
Crawford autopsy report decisions from other states.6' The court next
determined that an autopsy report fell within Maryland's business and
public records exceptions to hearsay. 69 Despite finding that the hearsay
rule did not bar admission of the report, however, the court held that the
trial judge must analyze each statement within the report to determine
whether the individual statements are testimonial for Confrontation
Clause purposes."7
The court distinguished between "findings . . . of the physical
condition of a decedent" that are "not analytical" on the one hand, and
"contested conclusions or opinions" on the other."' The court held that
the former category of statements-findings of the physical condition of
the decedent-were non-testimonial because they were objective and
generally reliable . However, contested conclusions and opinions
"central to the determination of the corpus dilecti" are testimonial
because "they serve the same function as testimony and trigger the Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation.
' '1
71
III. POST-CRAWFORD ADMISSIBILITY OF AUTOPSY REPORTS: NEW
FRAMEWORK, SAME RESULTS
Some of the rationales employed by the various state courts in
determining constitutional admissibility of autopsy reports are
166. Id. at 827-28, 848. Dr. Pestaner had left the state of Maryland to practice in
California. Id. at 827 n.4. Interestingly, the trial judge "urged defense counsel to
subpoena Dr. Pestaner" when the prosecution stated it might not do so. Id. at 827 n.4.
167. Id. at 827. Throughout the trial, Rollins admitted to the burglary but maintained
that he did not kill Ebberts. Id. at 825. Instead, he argued that Ebberts died of natural
causes. Id. at 825, 827-28. But the jury disagreed, and convicted him of Ebberts' murder.
Id. at 823.
168. Id. at 828-35.
169. Id. at 835-38.
170. See id. at 845-46.
171. Id. at 841.
172. See id. at 845-46; see also Rollins v. State, 866 A.2d 926, 952 n.12 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2005), aff d 897 A.2d 821 (Md. 2005) (explaining that the physical descriptions within
the autopsy report were "objectively ascertained, generally reliable, and normally
undisputed").
173. Rollins, 897 A.2d at 841.
20081
Catholic University Law Review
questionable. As discussed below, the state courts in these cases appear
to strain their constitutional analysis to reach an outcome that accords
with the public policy of prosecuting alleged murderers even though the
medical examiner is no longer available.
174
A. Taking the "Back Door" and Re-introducing Reliability
The first questionable analytical pathway was used in the Durio case.
There, the court reasoned that because Crawford mentioned in dicta that
business records are non-testimonial, and because autopsy reports are
admissible under New York's business record exception to the hearsay
rule, autopsy reports must therefore be non-testimonial. 7  This could be
called a "back door" approach to the Crawford analysis: the Durio court
fits the statements into a category which it believes is non-testimonial,
rather than analyzing whether the statements fall within any of the
Crawford formulations of testimonial.176  This approach appears to
exempt from Confrontation Clause scrutiny anything that fits within the
state's "business records" evidentiary classification. 1
77
The problem with this reasoning is that a document's qualification as a
business record under state evidence rules is based on its reliability. "8
Therefore, under the Durio approach, hearsay evidence is classified as
non-testimonial based on a court's evidentiary determination of
reliability. Since Crawford specifically rejected reliability as the test for
Confrontation Clause admissibility, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
would approve of a method that re-incorporates reliability as the
preliminary step in a Confrontation Clause analysis.' Furthermore, this
method fails to adequately apply Crawford because it makes no attempt
to analyze whether the autopsy report falls within any of the Crawford
formulations of "testimonial..'. °
174. See infra Part III.
175. See People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863,866-69 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 2005).
176. See id. at 866.
177. See id. at 867-69; see also Rollins, 897 A.2d at 831 ("Crawford's reference to...
business records as non-testimonial statements has led other jurisdictions to hold that
finding evidence to be a business record automatically excepts that document from
Confrontation Clause scrutiny.").
178. See Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d at 867 ("The rationale for the business record exception
is grounded in both necessity and enhanced reliability.").
179. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
180. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004). The closest the Durio
court came to analyzing whether the autopsy report statements fit within one of the
Crawford formulations was in its conclusion that
[t]he autopsy report in the case was not manufactured for the benefit of the
prosecution. Indeed, an autopsy is often conducted before a suspect is identified
or even before a homicide is suspected. That it may be presented as evidence in
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B. Avoiding Crawford's Third Formulation by Adopting a Narrow View
of "Testimonial"
The Denoso court purported to analyze whether autopsy reports fall
with any of the Crawford formulations of testimonial. 8' Problematically,
the court did not consider the "categories of testimonial evidence
described in Crawford.'.. to be the three possible definitions offered by
the Court in Crawford, 3 but instead considered those categories to be
"prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury,... at a
former trial[, . . . or] a statement given in response to police
interrogations. ' 84 These are the types of statements the Supreme Court
said the term testimonial covers "at a minimum.', 8 ' The Denoso court
failed to apply any of the three possible formulations of the term
testimonial offered by the Supreme Court, applying only the narrowest
of definitions.
Autopsy reports arguably fall within the third formulation noted by the
Court in Crawford: "statements that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial."' 87 It seems highly
likely that a medical examiner, while performing an autopsy on a victim
who has died a violent death, believes that the statements he makes in his
report will be available for later use at trial."" In Denoso, this particular
autopsy was in fact ordered by a Justice of the Peace under statutory
a homicide trial does not mean that it was composed for that accusatory purpose
or that its use by a prosecutor is the inevitable consequence of its composition.
Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d at 868-69.
181. Moreno Denoso v. State, 156 S.W.3d 166, 182 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) ("Based on
our review, the autopsy report in this case does not fall within the categories of testimonial
evidence described in Crawford.").
182. Id.
183. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52
184. Moreno Denoso, 156 S.W.3d at 182.
185. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former
trial; and to police interrogations.").
186. See id. at 51-52; Moreno Denoso, 156 S.W.3d at 182.
187. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (quoting Brief of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 79, at 3).
188. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-4-1 (Lexis Nexis 1995) ("When a coroner has been
informed that a person has been killed or suddenly died under such circumstances as to
afford a reasonable ground for belief that such death has been occasioned by the act of
another by unlawful means, he must forthwith make inquiry of the facts and circumstances
of such death by taking the sworn statement in writing of the witnesses having personal
knowledge thereof and submit the same to a judge of a court of record or a district
attorney.").
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directive." 9 Indeed, Professor Giannelli makes a plausible argument that
scientific evidence such as autopsy reports may even fall within the first
two possible definitions of testimonial because "[ilt is not too much of a
step to argue that a laboratory report is simply the affidavit of an
expert."' 9
C. Addressing the Third Formulation, but Dodging the Issue
The Lackey and Rollins courts addressed the question of whether
autopsy reports fall within the third formulation of testimonial.19" ' The
court's answer in Rollins was that, while the autopsy report might
eventually be used in a criminal trial, such use is not the express purpose
of the report's statements. 92  Instead, the report is created under
statutory duty. 93  But this resolution dodges the issue. The third
Crawford formulation of testimonial does not inquire into the express
purpose for which the declarant is making the statements, but rather,
whether the declarant may reasonably believe that the statements will be
used in future litigation.9 4 A medical examiner making statements under
a statutory duty would reasonably believe the statements will be used in
later litigation.
The Lackey court provides an even less satisfactory answer. There, the
defendant urged the court to assess the testimonial nature of the autopsy
report by looking at the expectation of how the report would be used. 95
Lackey argued that "[w]here autopsy reports are prepared in cases of
homicide,.., the expectation of a criminal prosecution is clearly in mind
and therefore the reports are testimonial.', 9 6 The court's response was
simply that "none of the cases which have addressed autopsy reports
under Crawford have adopted this point of view."' 97
189. Moreno Denoso, 156 S.W.3d at 180 & n.8 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
Art. 49.25, §§ 6, 9, 11 (Vernon 2006)).
190. Giannelli, supra note 7, at 27.
191. State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332, 348-49 (Kan. 2005); Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821,
838 (Md. 2006).
192. Rollins, 897 A.2d at 838.
193. See id. at 838-39 ("It is clear that there is a statutory duty to prepare such a report
when a death has occurred in 'any suspicious or unusual manner."' (quoting MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-309(b) (Lexis Nexis 2005))).
194. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) (quoting Brief of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 79, at 3).





D. A Second, Inappropriate Dose of Reliability
Another questionable line of reasoning in Rollins and Lackey is the
distinction made between objective, non-analytical findings and
contested conclusions and opinions.'" The basis for the distinction
classifying objective, non-analytical findings as non-testimonial is
reliability.' 99 In a manner analogous to Durio, the Lackey and Rollins
courts inject reliability back into the Confrontation Clause analysis.2°°
Although this distinction may have been appropriate under a Roberts
analysis, Crawford has specifically rejected reliability as the test for
Confrontation Clause admissibility. TM
IV. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding strong arguments by defendants that autopsy reports
should be considered testimonial, public policy appears to be driving
courts to find autopsy reports non-testimonial under Crawford1 O If the
United States Supreme Court agrees with the states, it could resolve the
issue by narrowing the definition of testimonial. Specifically, the Court
could eliminate the third Crawford formulation of testimonial:
statements that the declarant reasonably believes will be available for use
in future litigation. The Court could also explicitly disagree with the
argument that autopsy reports act as the affidavit of a medical examiner
but still maintain the first two Crawford formulations. However, for
now, prosecutors seem to have won the day.
198. Lackey, 120 P.3d at 351-52; Rollins, 897 A.2d at 839-41.
199. See, e.g., Rollins v. State, 866 A.2d 926, 954 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005), aff'd 897
A.2d 821 (Md. 2006) ("[F]indings in an autopsy report of the physical condition of a
decedent,... which are objectively ascertained and generally reliable and enjoy a generic
indicium of reliability, may be received into evidence without the testimony of the
examiner." (emphasis added)).
200. See supra Part Il.A.
201. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
202. See Lackey, 120 P.3d at 351 ("We believe the reason why these cases have not
adopted the arguments and reasoning set forth by the defendant is that it would have the
effect of requiring the pathologist [who performed the autopsy] to testify in every criminal
proceeding. If, as in this case, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy is
deceased or otherwise unavailable, the State would be precluded from using the autopsy
report in presenting its case, which could preclude the prosecution of a homicide case.").
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